![](/static/253f0d9b/assets/icons/icon-96x96.png)
![](https://lemmy.ml/pictrs/image/a64z2tlDDD.png)
here’s also some more context and explanation about what’s going on:
https://fedi.fyralabs.com/notes/9psdqurvye
https://fedi.fyralabs.com/notes/9psnooe6p1
https://fedi.fyralabs.com/notes/9pth6oh3xr
here’s also some more context and explanation about what’s going on:
https://fedi.fyralabs.com/notes/9psdqurvye
https://fedi.fyralabs.com/notes/9psnooe6p1
https://fedi.fyralabs.com/notes/9pth6oh3xr
The 90 days disclosure you’re referencing, which I believe is primarily popularized by Google’s Project Zero process, is the time from when someone discovers and reports a vulnerability to the time it will be published by the reporter if there is no disclosure by the vendor by then.
The disclosure by the vendor to their users (people running Lemmy instances in this case) is a completely separate topic, and, depending on the context, tends to happen quite differently from vendor to vendor.
As an example, GitLab publishes security advisories the day the fixed version is released, e.g. https://about.gitlab.com/releases/2024/01/11/critical-security-release-gitlab-16-7-2-released/.
Some vendors will choose to release a new version, wait a few weeks or so, then publish a security advisory about issues addressed in the previous release. One company I’ve frequently seen this with is Atlassian. This is also what happened with Lemmy in this case.
As Lemmy is an open source project, anyone could go and review all commits for potential security impact and to determine whether something may be exploitable. This would similarly apply to any other open source project, regardless of whether the commit is pushed some time between releases or just before a release. If someone is determined enough and spends time on this they’ll be able to find vulnerabilities in various projects before an advisory is published.
The “responsible” alternative for this would have been to publish an advisory at the time it was previously privately disclosed to admins of larger instances, which was right around the christmas holidays, when many people would already be preoccupied with other things in their life.
i don’t want to go to all that effort
true, my comment was primarily from the perspective of the recipient of tracking links
I haven’t checked how reddit does this but just from the example it seems like there is no anti tracking from the use of urlcheck that you’re describing.
reddit appears to generate tracking link with a specific numeric identifier in their database, so instead of attaching a bunch of removable url parameters they instead do a lookup in their database and then redirect to the original destination.
this also means your app checking the redirect will need to fetch the url to determine the destination, which means their tracking still works just fine.
edit: a word
indeed, original source is the wrong term, but at least it’s an english derivation of it, which was only copied by the link in this post
it is indeed somewhat attributed, but it still very much looks like scraped content.
a very strong indicator is the inclusion of
Subscribe The most engaging reads in blockchain. Delivered once a week.
Email address
SUBSCRIBE
at the end, which on cointelegraph’s page is separate from the content and provides a sign-up form.
why is this a blog spam article badly copied from the original source at https://cointelegraph.com/magazine/china-dev-fined-salary-vpn-10m-ecny-airdrop-asia-express/ ?
search for mautrix whatsapp (not a typo)
if you’re not community banned you might still be instance banned on the community instance, which wouldn’t show up in your local instances modlog if the ban happened on a <0.19.4 instance. if the methods pointed out by other comments here fail I suggest you visit the instance of the community and check the site modlog there, searching for your user.
i suspect you’re referring to your post to a lemmy.ml community and you have indeed been instance banned there for a limited amount of time.